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Abstract. To cooperate or not is one of the most challenging issues of supply chain management 
era. If the supply chain is managed optimally, the entire profitability increases. Meanwhile, corporate 
Social Responsibility (hereafter CSR) is defined as the social and ethical behavior of supply chain 
members against stakeholders such as shareholders, final customers, employees and executives. 
Moreover, the observance of the social responsibility obligations is of great importance for con-
sumers and shareholders of companies. The decisions of the supply chain’s members play a direct 
role in determining the profits of each. These decisions are in conflict with other members in a 
competitive environment. 
In this paper, the contradictory variables encompasses the cost resulting from the performance of 
corporate social responsibility, inventory, shortage, advertising and pricing in a two-level supply 
chain, consisting a manufacturer and a retailer. After identifying the quantitative variables for mea-
suring the social responsibility using Delphi-Fuzzy methods and Interpretive Structural Modeling, 
the most important and influential variable of measuring the social responsibility performance 
(forced labor ratio) has been selected. Subsequently, after modeling the profit function of each 
player, optimal results were emanated according to the bargaining power of each member and based 
on Nash and Stackelberg games. Afterwards, with numerical examples, the optimization and sensi-
tivity analysis of social responsibility in each model has been discussed. The results indicate that the 
profit of manufacturer and retailer reduces by increasing the proportion of forced labor. Based upon 
Nash equilibrium, the manufacturer’s profit decreases with a slight slope; nonetheless, on retailer 
and manufacturer leadership models, the profit decreases with a slight increase of the forced labor.
Keywords: supply chain management, Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg game, corporate social re-
sponsibility.
JEL Classification: C68, C72. 
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Introduction
Supply chain (henceforth SC) sustainability has three dimensions: economic, social and en-
vironmental. Sustainable supply chain management has been analyzed in various fields of 
economic activities: construction engineering and economic (Zavadskas, Šaparauskas, & An-
tucheviciene, 2018; Akcay, Ergan, & Arditi, 2017), infrastructure and construction projects 
development (Lopez, Chong, Moon, & Wang, 2017; Ju, Ding, & Skibniewski, 2017). CSR is 
one of the important and distinct dimensions in SC management (Hediger, 2010). Limited 
researches have performed in the field of social responsibility. The observance of the social 
responsibility obligations is very important for consumers and shareholders of companies 
(Ashby, Leat, & Hudson-Smith, 2012). In response to this pressure, many members of the 
SC have created instructions to ensure that social responsibility is respected in the busi-
ness operations of their partners (Debing, Kevin, & Xiaowo, 2010). In fact, CSR leads to 
the creation of communication among stakeholders and it can be achieved by meeting the 
basic needs of stakeholders, employees, managers, customers, manufactures and suppliers 
(Maignan & Ferrell, 2004). 
For modeling the social responsibility in the SC, there is a need for quantitative measur-
able indicators rather than qualitative indicators. In addition to social responsibility, variables 
such as pricing, inventory, cost of deficiency and cost of advertising are contradictory to SC 
members.. In case the decisions are made according to the views of SC members, it is called 
the centralized decision-making approach. Using a centralized approach, an overall optimal 
solution can be achieved for all SC members; however, it may contradict the interests of some 
members. If the solution is not compatible with the interests of some members, they may 
refuse to enforce the decision. 
There is a need for a coordination mechanism to create an overall optimal solution and 
minimize its contradiction with the interests of the members. Coordination models have 
mechanisms to motivate all members to pursue the overall optimal decisions and resolve 
the chain members’ conflict.
Game theory solves the conflict between two or more players, regarding the payoff of each 
of them. If the power of bargaining among the players of the SC is equal, the game is Nash, 
and if one player is leader and the other is follower, the game is called Stackelberg. In this 
article, the manufacturer is responsible for the costs of social responsibility and the retailer 
is responsible for the costs of advertising and marketing the final product. Additionally, the 
costs of shortages and incremental behavior are considered for the manufacturer (Jia, Amoo-
zad Mahdiraji, Govindan, & Meidutė, 2013). Therefore, considering the importance of coor-
dination and conflict solution in the SC with regard to the social responsibility, this research 
has been designed to model and optimize the consequences of retailers and manufactures in 
complete information conditions. First of all, identifying the most beneficial variable in social 
responsibility performance evaluation of a supply chain has been scheduled. Afterwards, 
Based upon game theoretic approach and considered two echelon supply chain, Nash and 
Stackelberg equilibriums were calculated to optimize supply chain overall profit. Eventually, 
the emanated equilibriums were compared with each other on the basis of sensitivity analysis. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Initially, an overview on the literature and back-
ground of previous researches in the field of corporate social responsibility measurements 
indicators, demand function, contradictory variables and SC games is illustrated. Next, the 
methodology of the research and modeling assumptions are reviewed. Afterwards, the sym-
bols, the modeling of the outcome of each player, the concavity and the best responses of 
each member are examined. Eventually, the numerical example and the sensitivity analysis 
of social responsibility is discussed.
1. Basic concepts and research background
CSR is defined as the social and ethical behavior of supply chain’s members against stakehold-
ers such as shareholders, end customers, employees, and managers (Panda, 2014). In a more 
comprehensive definition, corporate social responsibility can be defined as follows (Working 
definition, ISO 26000 Working Group on Social Responsibility, 2007) “Social responsibility 
is a social and ethical behavior against stakeholders that enhances society’s welfare and some 
standards have been edited for it through laws and guidelines.”
Few researches have performed in the field of social responsibility and innovation in 
supply chains (Seuring & Müller, 2008; Ashby et al., 2012; Ahi & Searcy, 2015; Puška, 
Maksimović, & Stojanović, 2018; Fazlollahtabar, 2018; Lukovac & Popović, 2018). In SC 
modeling, quantitative and measurable variables are required to measure the CSR. There are 
various references for classifying the social responsibility indicators, including the Global 
Reporting Initiative (henceforth GRI), in which classes of labor practices, good and suitable 
work, human rights, product and social responsibility are considered. Several indicators have 
been investigated for quantitative measurement of social responsibility, some of which have 
been summarized in Table 1. 
The demand function has been used to enter the Social Responsibility Measurement In-
dex. In fact, demand is dependent on the manufacturer’s social responsibility performance. 
Previous related researches and the type of demand functions have been presented in Table 2. 
For demand function at certain environments (C), for uncertain conditions (U), for linear 
type (L) and for nonlinear functions (N) is employed. 
Note that D is demand, q is fixed coefficient of demand function, α presents the price (P) 
elasticity, β denotes the effect of advertising costs (C) and γ measures the impact of corpo-
rate social responsibility (CSR) efforts. Remark that, similar researches in the area of  social 
responsibility has been summarized in Table 3.
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Table 1. Quantitative indicators of social responsibility
Research Quantitative indicators examined












(Kruse, Flysjö, Kasperczyk, & Scholz, 2009) Working hours
(de Bloom et al., 2009) Vacation
(Cascio, 2010) Dismissal of employees
(Lim, Chan, & Dallimore, 2010)






(DPE, 2011) Collective bargaining agreements
(Erol, Sencer, & Sari, 2011) Discrimination
Staff complaints
(Roca & Searcy, 2012) Unified staff
(OECD, 2012) Job Satisfaction 
(Klassen & Vereecke, 2012) Innovation
(Caulier-Grice, Davies, Patrick, & Norman, 2012)
Innovation
New products
(Hassini, Surti, & Searcy, 2012) Practices of stable suppliers
(Uma, 2013) Education
(Katsikea, Theodosiou, & Morgan, 2014) Staff turnover
(Kwon & Milgrom, 2014) Promotion Rate (Promotion)
(Mani, Agrawal, & Sharma, 2014)
Wage level Between Sexes
Labor Children
forced labor of labor forces
(European Commission, 2014) New products




(Simoes, Freitas, Barbosa-Povoa, & Carvalho, 2016) Staff turnover
(T. Strandberg, von Bonsdorff, A. Strandberg, Pitkala, & 
Raikkonen, 2017) Vacation
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Examined variables Demand equation
Goering, 2012 C L Price D a bp w= − −




£D a bp e y= − + γ +
Panda, 2014 C L Price ( )D p a bp= −
Modak, Panda, Sana, 
& Basu, 2014 C L Price ( )r r d rD a bp p p= q − +∝ −
Panda, Modak, Basu, 
& Goyal, 2015 C L Price ( )D p a bp= −
Modak, Panda, 
Mishra, & Sana, 
2016
C L Price ( )D p a bp= −
Modak et al., 2016 C L Price ( )r r rij ij ij ijD a bp p p= − +q −
Panda, Modak, & 
Cárdenas-Barrón, 
2017




U L CSRCSR ( )( )0 agµ + e
Raj, Biswas, & 
Srivastava, 2018 U L CSRCSR ( )0 ayµ +
Amoozad Mahdiraji, 
Shateri, Beheshti, & 
Mokhtarzadeh, 2019










. . .D P C CSR−α β γ= q
Table 3. Related Research background













Ni, Li, & 
Tang, 2010 2
price-




















Hsueh, 2014 2 CSRCSR- dependent ý þ ý ý
social 
responsibility
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2. Methodology and research assumptions
2.1. Research assumptions
1. The SC has a knowledgeable manufacturer and retailer and the manufacturer sells its 
product to the retailer;
2. The demand is dependent on price, promotional costs and social responsibility perfor-
mance cost;
3. Shortage cost is considered per unit of shortage. This fee is intended for the manufac-
turer; 
4. The scale advantage and the incremental behavior are supposed in the production. 
5. Decision variables include inventory, shortage, pricing, marketing costs and the perfor-
mance of social responsibility;
6. Optimal policies have been explored in non-cooperative static (Nash) and continuous 
dynamic (Stackelberg) modes;
7. The planning horizon is unlimited and the game is non-repetitive;
8. A single product is produced and sent to a retailer;
9. The status of players’ information is considered complete, that is, both players are fully 
aware of the strategies, outcomes and movements of each other;
End of Table 3
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10. The retailer is responsible for the advertising cost and the manufacturer is responsible 
for the social responsibility cost. 
2.2. Research methodology
The methodology of this paper consists of numerous steps in four phases presented below. 
(1) Literature review. First of all, by studying the background of the research, variables 
related to sustainability and social responsibility have been gathered. Secondly, variables 
are categorized quantitatively and qualitatively according to groups related to sustain-
ability and social responsibility. Note that, the basis of this study is those variables that 
are quantitative and measurable by mathematical relations. 
(2) Delphi Fuzzy. Next, the Delphi-Fuzzy questionnaire with a scale of 1 to 10 grade was 
designed for the second stage variables and distributed among experts and specialists 
and its results were analyzed. The fourth step involves the selection of high convergence 
variable from Delphi-Fuzzy method and the formation of a structural self-interactive 
matrix and distribution of its questionnaire among experts and specialists. 
(3) Interpretive Structural Modeling. After gathering the experts’ opinions, the formation 
of the initial reachability matrix is studied. Subsequently, designing the final reachabil-
ity matrix; determining the relations and leveling indicators; modeling the network of 
interactions and analyzing the power of influence and degree of dependence used in the 
interpretive and structural analysis are applied. 
(4) Optimization based on game theory. Afterwards, modeling, optimization and numeri-
cal examples of non-cooperative models of Nash and Stackelberg are discussed. 
Phase 1) Literature review 
In this paper, upon Popovich et al. research (Popovic, Povoa, Kraslawski, & Carvalho, 2018) 
31 quantitative indicators of social responsibility measurement have been examined in nine 
categories as Table 4. 
Table 4. Quantitative indexes in corporate social responsibility
Definition/Sub Criteria’sMain Index
Employee turnover, Employee layoffs, Working hours,  
Full- and part-time employees, Years of service
Employment benefits and 
characteristics
Promotion rate, Unionized employeesEmployment practices and relations
Time lost, Accidents, Risk assessment, Healthcare security  
coverage, Implementation of risk control
Health and safety (H&S) practices 
and incidents
Training, Education levelTraining, education, and personal skills
Ratio of genders, Wage level between genders, Disabled  
employees, Income distributionDiversity and equal opportunities
Vacation, Work satisfactionEmployee welfare
Innovations, New products, Scientific publicationsInnovation and competitiveness
Personnel security training, Child labor, Bonded labor,  
Collective bargaining agreements, Sustainable suppliers practice
Human rights implementation  
and integration
Discrimination, Employee complaints, Rights of indigenous peopleBasic human rights practice
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Phase 2) Fuzzy-Delphi method
1. Identifying the quantitative indicators for measuring the corporate social responsibility;
2. Designing a questionnaire in which expert’s weigh identified factors in the range of 1 to 
10. Therefore, for each of the identified factors in the first stage, score state as Equation (1):
 ( ), ,ik ik ikC L U=  (1)
where Likis the most pessimistic score of kth expert given to ith criteria, similarly Uik is the 
most optimistic score.
3. At this stage, the geometric mean of the most pessimistic and optimistic scores given by 
the respondent k to ith criteria has been calculated by Equation (2):
 .ik ik ikg L U= ×  (2)
Therefore, for ith criteria, by kth expert, related score is resulted from Equation (3):
 ( ), , .ik ik ik ikC L g U=  (3)
4. The geometric mean and standard deviation of the most pessimistic and optimistic scores 
were emanated. Afterwards, the scores that are out of the range ± 2std were eliminated. 
Next, from the most pessimistic remaining scores, the lowest value  ilC , the maximum value 
i
uC  and the geometric mean  imC  has been calculated. Similarly, the lowest value of ilO , the 
maximum value of  iuO and the geometric mean of  imO  were resulted. 
5. For the agent i, the most pessimistic index  iC and the most optimistic index  iO are cal-
culated as Equations (4) and (5): 
 ( ), , ;
i i i i
m ulC C C C=  
(4)
 ( ), , .i i i im ulO O O O=  (5)
6. The consensus of the expert’s answers were examined. One of the following three situa-
tions can be occurred. 
 – If there is no cover between two fuzzy triangle numbers ( i iu lC O≤ ), there is an agree-
ment on the agent i among the respondents and the meaningful consensus amount is 









 – If there is a coverage area between the two fuzzy triangle numbers (for example 
( i iu lC O> ), then the value of the geometric mean distance  
iM and the value of the gray 
region distance iZ  should be obtained using following Equations (7) and (8):
 ; i i im mM O C= −  (7)
 .i i iu lZ C O= −  (8)
 – If   i iZ M≤ , the meaningful amount of the consensus of the experts  iG is calculated 







i i i i
u m mli
i i i i
u m m l
C O O C
G
C C O O
 × − ×=
 − + −  
(9)
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If  i iZ M> , there is a great deal of difference between the opinion of the experts and the 
steps should be repeated until convergence is achieved.
In the final step, the threshold value of (S) for extracting the essential factors from the list 
of potential agents were determined. Note that, there are essentially no identical and standard 
methods for determining the threshold value; however, in some cases the threshold value is 
considered based on / (80–20) law. If   iG S≥ , ith criterion is selected for further analysis (Kuo 
& Chen, 2008; Hanafizadeh & Mirzazadeh, 2011).
Considering aforementioned procedure, nine variables embracing accidents, security cov-
erage, gender ratio, pay level between genders, disabled workers, income distribution, child 
labor, forced labor and discrimination were selected as the final indicators of the experts in 
the Fuzzy-Delphi method.
Phase 3) Interpretive Structural-Modeling
The Interpretative Structural-Modeling Technique (henceforth ISM) was first developed by 
Warfield in 1973. Since then, it has been widely used in various decision making areas. This 
technique gives the decision maker the ability to formulate a variety of relevant elements in a 
comprehensive systematic model. The ISM technique, by utilizing the experience and knowl-
edge of related professionals, divides a complex system into several different subsystems, and 
in this way, it discovers the independent or interdependent relationships among the existing 
elements in the system (Chen & Wu, 2010) ISM technique steps are as follows.
Step 1. Identifying the variables related to the question.
Step 2. Creating Structural Interactive Matrix. This stage leads to analysis by following 
symbols to determine the relationships between variables.
V: This means that the index i leads to j.
A: This means that the index j leads to i.
X: To illustrate the two-way effect
O: To indicate the absence of a relationship between the two indicators
Step 3. Creating an Initial Reachability Matrix. In order to replace the numbers zero and 
one instead of the four symbols of the above table, the following rules are used to extract 
the initial reachability matrix. 
 – If input (i, j) in the structural self-interactive matrix is v, then place 1 in (i, j) and 0 
in (j, i);
 – If input (i, j) in the structural self-interactive matrix is A, then place 0 in (i, j) and 1 
in (j, i);
 – If input (i, j) in the structural self-interactive matrix is X, then place 1in (i, j) and 1 
in (j, i);
 – If input (i, j) in the structural self-interactive matrix is O, then place 0 in (i, j) and 0 
in (j, i);
 – If i = j, 1 is placed in the initial reachability matrix. The results are shown at the fol-
lowing Table 5 and 6 (Azar, Khosravani, & Jalal, 2013).
Step 4. Creating the Final Reachability Matrix. If (i,  j) are interconnected and (j, k) are 
interconnected, then (i, k) are interconnected.
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Step 5. Determining the Relationships and Leveling the Indicators. In this step, using the 
final reachability matrix, after assigning input and output sets, it is possible to share these 
sets for each of the barriers. 
Step 6. Drawing an Interactions Network Model. In this stage, the final model is obtained 
according to the levels of the indicators and the final reachability matrix and through the 
elimination of secondary relationships and in the interpretive structural modeling, this 
figure is called the structural or diagraph model. 
Step 7. Analyzing the power of penetration and the degree of dependency. At this stage, the 
variables are classified into four groups. The first group consists of autonomous variables 
(region 1) with weak influence. The second group includes dependent variables (region 2) 
that have a weak influence but a high dependence. The third group is the transplant vari-
ables (region 3). These variables have a high degree of influence. In fact, any action on these 
variables leads to a change in other variables. The fourth group is the independent variables 
(area 4) (Azar et al., 2013).
Considering the statistical fashion of the faculty members’ viewpoints, the self- interac-
tive structural matrix is  as follows. The initial reachability matrix is  obtained by converting 
a structural self-interactive matrix to a two-value matrix (zero and one). The results are 
presented in Table 5. In order to achieve the ultimate reachability matrix, after the initial 
reachability matrix is  obtained, its internal consistency should be established; accordingly, 
the result are demonstrated in the Tables 6, 7 and 8. Remark that, the numbers marked * are 
shown to be zero in the original matrix and converted to one after compatibility.
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In order to find the forming components of system’s next level, its highest components 
are eliminated in the corresponding table calculations and operations related to determining 
the next level components are performed like the method for determining the highest-level 
components. In the next step, the interaction network model has been plotted. At this stage, 
the final model is obtained according to the level of the indexes and the final reachability 
matrix, and by eliminating the secondary relations, which is called structured or diagraph 
modeling in Figure 1.
Obviously, no variables are located in area 4. Indicators 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 are located in 
area 3 (Linked) and have the highest penetration and maximum dependency. Indicator 9 is 
located in Zone 2 and has high dependence and medium penetration. Indicator 5 is in zone 
1 and has the lowest degree of dependency influence. As in the penetration-power matrix, 
the index of discrimination (racial, sexual, discrimination against the disabled, harassment, 
and violence) is in the area of  dependency, indicating the low power of influence; nonethe-
less, the high degree of dependency toward other indices. Accidents’ indicators, number of 
reported accidents per year, health coverage, number of employees with social security, health 
insurance, sex ratio between male and female employees, level of payment between genders, 
income distribution among employees and forced labor factors indicate high dependency 
and penetration power, all of which are key indicators for measuring the sustainability and 
social responsibility. 
Among the key indicators, forced labor as the most influential indicator should be con-
sidered by the supply chain members more than others. Moreover, due to high dependency 
in this area, any action on these indicators changes other indicators. Forced labor (BLratio) 
is the registered percentage of forced labor in the supply chain (Mani et al., 2014). In the 
next sections, this index has been included in the supply chain models through the demand 
function based on Table 9. 
In the Equation (10), BL is the number of registered labor in institution. Ntot denotes the 
total number of employees of the company.




4 6 2.7 Region 4 8 
7 
3 6 
Penetration 1 5 
9 4 
Region 2 Region 1 3 
2 
5 1 
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Dependency  
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Table 9. Selected index description
ID BL ratio
Descriptions Registered percent of the forced labor working in the supply chain 
Formula 






                                   
(10)
Unit of measure Percentage 
Measuring range Minimum 0 and maximum 100% 
Process less, better 
Scale Whole supply chain, entity 
Scheduling Periodically based on demand 
Audiences Management 
Additional explanation This indicator, like child labor, should be part of external auditing 
2.3. Phase 4) Mathematical modeling
2.3.1. Notations
Table 10 describes the functions, parameters and variables that are related to the modeling 
of the retailers’ outcomes. R stands for the retailer and M indicates the wholesaler. Note that, 
(F) stands for functions, (V) for decision variable and (P) for parameters.
Table 10. Retailer and manufacturer notations
Symbol Type Description Symbol Type Description
 














 , , ,q α β γ P
Demand function coefficient of 












RQ V Retailers Order Quantity
 
Md P








RTR F Retailers Total Revenue
 
MB V Manufacturer Shortage
 
RTMC F Retailers Total Marketing Costs
 
MB
C P Manufacturer Backlog Cost
 
RTOC F Retailers Total Ordering Costs
 
MP
C P Manufacturers Purchase Cost
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Symbol Type Description Symbol Type Description
 
RTHC F Retailers Total Holding Costs
 
ML
C P Manufacturers Unit Production Costs
 





















































Ordering and Setup 
Costs
 






















ϑ P Incremental coefficient of social responsibility
2.3.2. Retailers Payoff Function
In this part of research, payoff function of each player has been modeled. The retailer level 
has one member. To calculate the outcome of the retailer, the concept of the difference be-
tween revenues and costs has been used. Retailer’s costs include the cost of ordering, holding 
and advertising spent on each product. The function of the product demand of the retailer 
is as follows, which depends on the variables of the retailers price, advertising, and social 
responsibility measurement index. Remark that, the type of demand function is exponential 
as Equation (11). 
According to the results of Delphi-Fuzzy methods and structural interpretive modeling, 
the forced labor index as Equation (10) has been selected as the most influential indicator for 
measuring the social responsibility. This indicator is derived from the ratio of forced labor 
to the total number of employees at the desired level (Equation (12)), and therefore has a 
reverse relationship to demand. (Lee et al., 1996; Esmaeili et al., 2008; Huang & Huang, 2010; 
Gurnani et al., 2007; Ma et al., 2013; Jia et al., 2013).
End of Table 10
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= =   
   
(12)
 .. . .
MR R ratio
D P C BL−α β −γ= q
 
(13)
In Equation (13) D shows the demand, α presents the price elasticity of sensitive demand, 
β denotes the impact factor of advertising, and γ measures the impact of social responsibil-
ity efforts. The income of the retailer emanates from multiplying the profit margin in the 
product demand as Equation (14). The profit margin of a retailer Equation (16) is obtained 
from the difference in the wholesale purchase price from the sale price of the final customer 
(Equation (15)). 
 ;R RTR G D= ×  (14)
 ;R R MG P P= −  (15)
 . .. .
MR R M R R ratio
TR P P P C BL−α β −γ= − ×q    
(16)
In Equation (21), the total cost of retailer including maintenance, ordering and advertis-
ing costs has been emanated based upon Equations (17) to (20).
 ;R R R RTC TMC TOC THC= + +  (17)









 ;1   
2 RR R h M
THC Q C P= × × ×
 
(20)
 ( )( )1 1. . . .   .2M R RR R R ratio R O R R h MTC P C BL C C Q Q C P−α β −γ −   = q × + + × × ×       (21)
To illustrate retailers profits function, the pR symbol has been employed, which is derived 
from the difference income and retailers costs in Equation (22). 
 .R R RTR TCp = −  (22)
Retailer’s restrictions include a positive profit margin and non-zero demand less than 
production capacity. Thus, the retailer model, with regard to the limitations and assumptions 
of the research and Equation (11) to (22), emanates as Equation (23):
( )1 1. . . .  .2M R RR R R ratio R M R O R R h MP C BL P P C C Q Q C P−α β −γ −
  p = q × − − − + − × × ×         
(23)
In this section, the concavity of the retailer function has been examined. Equations (24), 
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 




As presented, the retail profit function is concave toward the retail price, order quantity, 
and marketing efforts.
2.3.3. Manufacturer Payoff Function
In this section, the payoff function for the manufacturer is emanated. The manufacturer’s 
income derives from the sale of the product minus its costs including purchasing raw materi-
als from suppliers, product shortages, setting up the production line, production, ordering, 
holding, and reducing the proportion of the forced labor (Wang & Tang, 2009; Oganezov, 
2006; Chakraborty et al., 2010; Chang, 2008; Pentico et al., 2009; Jia et al., 2013; Amoozad 
Mahdiraji, Zavadskas, & Razavi Hajiagha, 2015; Amoozad Mahdiraji, Govindan, Zavadskas, 
& Razavi Hajiagha, 2014). The shortage is compensated by the use of delayed orders. The 
manufacturer has a warehouse for storing the final product. The total income of the manufac-
turer consists of multiplying the manufacturer’s profit margin on the demand for the product 
as Equation (27). The profit margin of each manufacturer is derived from the difference in 
the wholesale price of the purchase and production costs and the cost of implementing the 
social responsibility in Equation (28). Total production and backlog costs besides manufac-
turer’s total revenue are presented in Equation (29) to (31) respectively.
 ( ) ;M M M M MTR G D P D TBC TPC= × = × − −  (27)
 ;
MM M P L M ratio
G P C C BL= − − −η
 
(28)
 ;. . .
M m MM P P R R ratio
TBC C D C P C BL−α β −γ= × = ×q
 
(29)
 ;. . .
M M MM L L R R ratio
TPC C D C P C BL−α β −γ= × = ×q
 
(30)
 .. . .
M M M MM M P L M ratio R R ratio
TR P C C BL P C BL−α β −γ = − − −η ×q   
(31)
The startup costs for the manufacturer includes the number of setup and the cost for each 
according to Equation (33) and similarly for ordering costs as Equation (34). The summation 
presents the total ordering and setup costs in Equation (35).





























 = + × 
 
(35)
The total cost of production includes the cost of production per unit of product multi-
plied by the amount of demand in Equations (36) and (38). It should be noted that the vari-
able cost of production per unit of product is considered as a function of product demand. 
Therefore, by increasing the demand for the product by retailers, the variable cost of produc-
tion for the corresponding product decreases with respect to the coefficient of influence of 
the scale dM in Equation (37) (Amoozad Mahdiraji et al., 2015) which is a type of benefits 
resulted from the increase in production. 
 ;
MM L





C u D−d= ×
 
(37)
( ) ( ) ( ). 1 . 1 . 111 . . . ,      0  1 , 0.M M MM
M Mm M M R R ratioM M M
TPC u D u P C BL if u−α −d β −d −γ −d−d−d= × = ×q <d
            
if  ( ) ( ) ( ). 1 . 1 . 111 . . . ,     0  1 , 0.M M MM
M Mm M M R R ratioM M M
TPC u D u P C BL if u−α −d β −d −γ −d−d−d= × = ×q <d
                                                                                             
(38) 
Total maintenance costs per manufacturer is presented in Equation (40) including final 
product storage costs that are calculated based on Equation (41). Where the cost is obtained 
in case the retailer’s demand exceeds the capacity of production with multiplying the cost of 
each shortage in shortages quantity. The cost of each shortage unit is time-dependent and 
includes outstanding and compensated orders.. It is worth mentioning that the manufacturer 
has a gradual behavior as Equation (42) (Wang & Tang, 2009; Oganezov, 2006; Chakraborty 
et al., 2010; Chang, 2008; Pentico et al., 2009). The summation of above mentioned costs 
leads to total related costs as Equation (43). 
 ;M M MTRC THC TSC= +  (39)
 



























































   q   − × −      = × +  q  × − ×     
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  × − ×
      
(43)
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The profit function of the manufacturer results from the differences of the total revenue 
and total cost of the manufacturer as Equation (44):
 ;M M MTR TCp = −  (44)
 .  M M M MTC TRC TPC TOSC= + +  (45)
According to the Equation (27) to (45), a general model of a manufacturer, taking into 
account its constraints, reveals as Equation (46):





. . . . . .
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−α β −γ q
  + ×  
                                                                     
(46)
 
In this section, the concavity of the manufacture’s profit function to decision variables 
has been examined. The following Equation (47) has been used to check the concavity as a 























   
(47)
Obviously, the profit function of the manufacturer is concave.
2.3.4. Best responses of players
In game theory, each player has rationality and awareness; thus, will not be satisfied in the 
Nash game with less than their optimal level (Amoozad Mahdiraji et al., 2014). In this sec-
tion, the best responses for each of the SC members, including the manufacturer and retailer 
has been designed based upon their decision variables from Equation (48) to (54). In order 
to find the optimal response, the derivation of payoff function of each player has been re-
sulted based upon related decision variables (Amoozad Mahdiraji et al., 2014). The results 
are presented in Table 11. 
Games can be cooperative or non-cooperative between manufacturer and retailer. In non-
cooperative mode, decisions are made in both Nash (Static) and Stackelberg (Dynamic). In 
non-cooperative games, decisions are made individually, players do not interact with each 
other; however, each player’s decisions are made with respect to the movement of others. If 
the game is in the mode of Nash or static, no player is superior to the other, and the strength 
of each player is equal to the other in bargaining. In a Stackelberg or Dynamic game mode, 
one member is either the leader or ahead of the other (Amoozad Mahdiraji et al., 2015).
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          − − × +        + ×       − + + × + + × +  = e        × − × × − ×                  − 
 
(54)
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2.3.5. The static non-cooperative games (Nash equilibrium)
In decentralized games, players independently choose the values  of their decision variables. 
This mode has been considered as the best player response in the previous section. In a cen-
tralized or merge mode, all members of SC jointly optimize their decision variables under a 
shared function. The decentralized non-cooperative Nash game is solely on the basis of the 
best responses of the manufacturer and retailer. In this case, the best responses are considered 
as constraints and solved. The decentralized model is resulted by solving Equations (13) and 
(48) to (58) conditional to Equations (55) to (58) as basic limitations:
 0;D ≥  (55)
 ( )[ ] 0;MMM P MP C u D−d− + × ≥  (56)
 ;M MD PC≤  (57)
 0.R MP P− >  (58)
2.3.6. Non-cooperative dynamic games (Stackelberg game)
In dynamic non-cooperative games, one of the members of SC is leader towards the other 
member. Decisions are made sequentially first by the leader and then by the follower. In this 
section, once the retailer and the manufacturer play the role of leader.
2.3.6.1. Retailer’s leadership
In this type of model, maximizing the profitability of the retailer by taking into account 
the manufacturers best responses has been considered. Therefore, the objective function is 
maximizing the profit of the retailer and the limits of this function are the manufacturer’s 
rationality and its best responses as model constraint. Considering the above conditions, the 
retailer’s leadership model is resulted by solving Equations (59), (13) and (51) to (58). 
( )1 1. . . .   2M M R RR R R ratio R M R O R R h MMAX P C BL P P C C Q Q C P−α β −γ β −    p = q × − − − + − × × ×     
( )1 1. . . .   2M M R RR R R ratio R M R O R R h MMAX P C BL P P C C Q Q C P−α β −γ β −    p = q × − − − + − × × ×     
                       
(59)
s.t:
Equations (13) and (51) to (58)
2.3.6.2. Manufacturer leadership 
In this case, the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. In this type of 
model, maximizing the manufacturer’s profit regarding the retailer’s best responses matters. 
Therefore, the objective function is the maximization of the manufacturer’s profit and the 
limits are the manufacturer’s rationality and its best responses as model constraint. Consider-
ing the above conditions, the manufacturer’s leadership model is resulted by solving Equa-
tions (60), (13) and (48) to (50) and (55) to (58).
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(60)
S.t:
Equations (13) and (48) to (50) and (55) to (58)
3. Numerical example
A numerical example for analyzing the proposed Nash and Stackelberg models are examined. 
The numeric data for the parameters is demonstrated in Table 12 based upon the assump-
tions of the considered two echelon supply chain and the notations mentioned in section 2.
The results of the Nash and Stackelberg models are obtained using global non-linear 
programming in Lingo.17 and presented in Table 13. The initial results indicate that the 
manufacturer leadership of Stackelberg equilibrium brings the highest overall profit for the 
considered supply chain and the retailer leadership nearly equals the revenue and costs; thus, 
limited profit is occurred. 
Considering the aim and the focus area of this research – the social responsibility – the 
behavior of the supply chain overall profit has been analyzed based upon the changes of the 
related factor. Hence, changes in forced labor ratio and its impact on overall profit of the sup-
ply chain has been investigated considering Nash and Stackelberg manufacturer leadership 
equilibriums in Table 14 and Figure 2 to 4. 
Table 12. Initial information of numerical example
q α β γ uM dM PCM MPC










C e ϑ RhC
0.5 1 4 7 5 1.1 1.1 0.15
                     Table 13. Profit of different models
ProfitProposed Model
19Nash Equilibrium
6Stackelberg Equilibrium − Retailer Leadership
96Stackelberg Equilibrium − Manufacturer Leadership
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It is clear that the ascent of BLratio diminishes the overall profit in all three considered 
situations including Nash and Stackelberg models. Based upon limited profit for Retailers 
leadership mode, this situation has not been evaluated further. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the 
effect of this factor more clearly of overall profit. 
Figure 2. Nash model behavior on BL ratio changes Figure 3. Stackelberg model behavior on BL 
ratio changes








































0.01 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 1
Nash – manufacture
Manufacturer Stackelberg
Table 14. Sensitivity analysis of social responsibility index on overall profit
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To compare the considered modes and evaluate the overall profit behaviors upon BLratio 
changes, Figure 4 has been presented. 
Considering Table 14 and Figures 2 to 4, it is worth noting here that among four proposed 
approaches, Nash equilibrium is more profitable than Stackelberg for the studied situation 
and designed supply chain. Moreover, based upon BLratio escalation, the overall profit of SC 
decreases in all proposed approaches, indicating the effectiveness of this criteria. For more 
than 20%, this criteria will lead to zero or negative profit in all considered situations. 
Conclusions
To cooperate or not is one of the most challenging issues in supply chain management era. If 
the supply chain is managed optimally, the entire profitability will be increased. Meanwhile, 
corporate Social Responsibility is defined as the social and ethical behavior of supply chain 
members against stakeholders such as shareholders, final customers, employees, and execu-
tives.
In this article, the manufacturer is responsible for the costs of social responsibility, and 
the retailer is responsible for the costs of advertising and marketing the final product. Addi-
tionally, the costs of shortages and incremental behavior are considered for the manufacturer. 
Therefore, considering the importance of coordination and conflict solution in the SC with 
regard to the social responsibility, this research has been designed to model and optimize the 
consequences of retailers and manufactures in complete information conditions. 
Furthermore, the considered variables encompasses the cost resulting from the perfor-
mance of corporate social responsibility, inventory and shortage, advertising and pricing in a 
two-level supply chain, consisting a manufacturer and a retailer. Identifying the quantitative 
variables for measuring the social responsibility using Delphi-Fuzzy methods and Interpre-
tive Structural Modeling, modeling the profit function of each player, optimizing each play-
ers payoff functions according to the bargaining power of each member based on Nash and 
Stackelberg games, were all performed. As a result, among four proposed approaches, Nash 
equilibrium is more profitable than Stackelberg for the studied situation and designed sup-
ply chain. Moreover, based upon BLratio escalation, the overall profit of SC decreases in all 
proposed approaches, indicating the effectiveness of this criteria.
Considering non cooperative situation and deterministic nonlinear demand function as 
main limitations of this research, future researches can focus on presenting or analyzing 
coordination contracts and probabilistic demand functions. Comparing the results obtained 
from cooperative situation with non-cooperative circumstance leads to interesting results. 
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